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Ever since the Supreme Court issued its short-lived and politically 
obtuse opinion in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,1 the 
issue of equal pay has risen to the forefront of the national conversation 
about gender equality. The Court’s decision ruled as time-barred Title VII 
claims challenging pay discrimination that originated outside of the 
statute’s very short charge-filing period—even when the pay 
discrimination is ongoing and continues to produce discriminatory 
paychecks that the employee receives within the time limit for suing.2 
The ruling prompted a strong public outcry, bolstered by one of Justice 
Ginsburg’s most impassioned and galvanizing dissents. Of the many 
scathing editorials excoriating the Court’s opinion, my favorite was from 
the New York Times, which summed up the ruling succinctly with the 
title, “Injustice 5, Justice 4.”3 
                                                            
 * Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law. I am grateful to Valerie Howell for her excellent research assistance in support 
of this article. 
 1. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 623–32. 
 3. Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/opinion/31thu1.html?_r=0. Other newspaper editorial 
boards joined in the fun. See, e.g., Editorial, Supreme Letdown; The High Court Finds a Way 
to Accept Discrimination, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 6, 2007, http://www.post-
gazette.com/opinion/editorials/2007/06/05/Supreme-letdown-The-high-court-finds-a-way-to-
accept-discrimination/stories/200706050212; see also Clarence Page, Editorial, Supreme 
Injustice on Worker Equality, THE BALTIMORE SUN, June 5, 2007, 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-06-05/news/0706050128_1_justice-supreme-court-only-
woman. 
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Congress responded with unusual speed, in time to present newly-
elected President Obama with the opportunity to sign into law the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (LLFPA) as the first new legislative enactment of 
his Administration. The Act essentially codified the approach advocated 
in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, overriding the majority ruling and 
correcting the time problem created by the Ledbetter Court. Under the 
LLFPA, each new paycheck that pays an employee less because of sex 
resets the clock for the limitations period for asserting the employee’s 
Title VII rights.4 The Act cured the immediate problem arising from the 
Ledbetter decision that ongoing pay discrimination beginning outside the 
limitations period was immunized from challenge, effectively 
grandfathered-in by the Court’s ruling, even if the employee did not 
realize she was being paid less until much later. 
The LLFPA was a needed corrective to the rights-claiming problem 
created by the Court. However, it did not affect the substantive law 
regulating pay inequality or do anything to alleviate the legal hurdles to 
succeeding on pay discrimination claims on their merits. The political 
movement for pay equality that was behind the Act has a much broader 
scope, however. With the sympathetic figure of the hardworking 
grandmother, Lilly Ledbetter, as the poster-child for the movement, equal 
pay has become a resurgent rallying cry for workers and politicians alike. 
Since the Ledbetter decision, there is a new energy and political resonance 
surrounding the gender wage gap and an urgency to fix it that has not 
been matched since the 1970’s women’s movement pressed the demand of 
equal pay for equal work. 
At the level of public policy, the movement to close the gender wage 
gap has coalesced around the Paycheck Fairness Act as a key piece of the 
equal pay law reform strategy. The proposed Paycheck Fairness Act was 
introduced in Congress on the heels of the legislative success with the 
LLFPA as a needed reform to address the substantive shortcomings of 
the equal pay laws. It has been repeatedly introduced, in slightly varying 
iterations, in each legislative session, but has failed to gain enough 
support to pass both houses of Congress.5 
The bill contains a multi-pronged approach to the problem, including 
measures to produce greater transparency in wages and enhanced 
protection from retaliation against employees for discussing or inquiring 
about employee pay.6 As for strengthening the substantive rights against 
pay discrimination, the cornerstone of the bill is a provision that would 
tighten up the primary defense in the Equal Pay Act, the “factor other 
                                                            
 4. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(3)(A).  
 5. See Irin Carmon, Republicans Block Paycheck Fairness Act Once Again, 
MSNBC.COM (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/republicans-block-paycheck-
fairness-act-again. 
 6. See Denise A. Cardman, The Paycheck Fairness Act: Major Provisions, AM. BAR 
ASS’N. (June 2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2015jun11_pfaprovisions.a
uthcheckdam.pdf. 
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than sex” (FOTS) defense, which immunizes a pay disparity from 
challenge. Depending on how broadly the defense is construed, it has the 
potential to derail equal pay claims by allowing any facially neutral factor 
to justify paying women less than men for performing equal work. The 
proposed bill would rein in the defense by requiring the factor to be bona 
fide, job-related and consistent with business necessity.7 The language 
borrows from the defense to Title VII disparate impact claims in an effort 
to require closer judicial scrutiny of the business reasons underlying 
facially neutrally reasons for paying workers of one sex less for doing 
substantially equal work. 
The proposed change to the FOTS defense is the most controversial 
part of the bill. Critics charge that it would intrude too deeply into 
employer discretion and take issue with proponents’ assertion that 
discrimination, as opposed to individual choice and market 
forces,explains the gender wage gap.8 More legally-oriented critics charge 
that the move would turn the disparate treatment claim into a disparate 
impact claim, without justification for doing so.9 Even supporters of 
closing the gender wage gap are less than enthusiastic about making the 
FOTS defense the centerpiece of the reform strategy.10 They point out 
that most pay discrimination cases falter before even getting to the 
defense because of the strict approach courts take to determining whether 
employees are performing substantially equal work.11 Unless courts 
moderate their approach to that threshold issue, reforming the factor 
other than sex defense will not make a difference in the success of equal 
pay claims in the courts. 
This essay considers the proposed changes to the FOTS defense in 
light of lessons gleaned from the Supreme Court’s innovative move in an 
employment discrimination case decided last year under the Pregnancy 
                                                            
 7. See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 862, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s862. 
 8. See David S. Joachim, Senate Republicans Block Bill on Equal Pay, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/us/politics/senate-republicans-block-bill-on-
equal-pay.html. 
 9. See, e.g., Gary Siniscalco et al., The Pay Gap, the Glass Ceiling, and Pay Bias: 
Moving Forward 50 Years After the Equal Pay Act, 29 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 395, 419 (2014) 
(characterizing the PFA as adopting a disparate impact model for equal pay claims); and see 
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Choices, Bias, and the Value of the Paycheck Fairness Act: A Response 
Essay, 29 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 429 (2014) (criticizing the PFA’s allowance of unlimited 
compensatory and punitive damages). 
 10. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market 
Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 206–08 (2011) [hereinafter 
Porter & Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth] (contending that the PFA will not provide a 
remedy for unequal pay for most women, including and especially professional women, because 
of the tightness of the comparators required to prove a violation, but nevertheless expressing 
tepid support for the PFA on the ground that a partial solution is better than none). 
 11. See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass 
Ceiling, 63 S.M.U. L. REV. 17 (2010) (surveying the lower courts’ case law and the 
demonstrating the strictness of the substantially similar work requirement in Equal Pay Act 
claims). 
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Discrimination Act, Young v. United Parcel Services, Inc.12 The 
framework adopted in that case can help pave the way for the tightening 
of the FOTS defense, while still keeping the claim grounded as a disparate 
treatment claim. Part I examines the application of the FOTS defense in 
the courts. While some courts have been moving to apply a heightened 
judicial scrutiny of the employer’s reasons for a pay disparity, others 
follow an anything-goes approach. Without careful scrutiny of the 
employer’s facially neutral reasons for paying women less, the pay 
discrimination claim segues into a search for the employer’s conscious 
intent to pay an employee less because of her sex, rendering the claim all 
but useless for remedying the gender wage gap. Part II explores the 
framework embraced in Young, in which unjustified impact supports an 
inference of intentional discrimination. It argues that the Equal Pay Act 
should take a page from the decision in Young and similarly move to 
scrutinizing employer justifications for the different treatment of 
comparators. Using insights from the Young decision, it responds to 
criticisms that tightening of FOTS defense would turn the equal pay 
claim into a disparate impact claim. Finally, Part III argues that the 
proposed framework for the FOTS defense is better designed to reach the 
kind of implicit bias that is at the heart of pay discrimination in the 
modern workforce. As important as preventing equal pay litigation from 
being derailed by an unconstrained FOTS defense is the contribution the 
proposed framework could make to the political dialogue about the roots 
of pay inequality and the justifications for employer practices that 
perpetuate it. By challenging the justifications for facially neutral 
reasons for paying women less, the change proposed to the FOTS in the 
Paycheck Fairness Act would make space for contesting the ideologies at 
the heart of the debate over the gender wage gap. 
I. THE FOTS DEFENSE IN THE COURTS: THE CONTROVERSY 
OVER JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF THE LEGITIMACY OF SEX-
NEUTRAL REASONS 
Enacted one year before Title VII, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 
prohibits an employer from paying an employee less than it pays an 
employee of the other sex to perform substantially similar work, unless 
the employer can justify the disparity under one of the four statutory 
defenses.13 Of these, by far the most important is the factor other than 
sex defense, which permits “a differential based on any factor other than 
sex.”14 Left unconstrained, the FOTS defense would immunize a pay 
                                                            
 12. Young v. UPS, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
 13. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: 
PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 49 (1994) (tracing the origins 
of the Equal Pay Act to a 1945 decision by the National Labor Board that the pay practices of 
certain military contractors discriminated against women; although the War Board was 
subsequently dismantled, its ruling prompted unions and women’s groups to agitate for 
greater protection from pay discrimination). 
 14. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(4) (2012). 
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disparity whenever any facially neutral reason, however insubstantial or 
irrational, could explain the gap in pay. An early amendment to Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, known as the Bennett Amendment, 
incorporated the defenses codified in the Equal Pay Act as defenses to 
Title VII as well.15 Accordingly, while Title VII reaches sex-based 
discrimination in compensation, the Equal Pay Act’s FOTS defense is also 
a defense to a Title VII claim for sex-based pay discrimination. So the 
scope of the FOTS defense matters for both Title VII and the Equal Pay 
Act. 
Early Supreme Court case law seemed to require more than a merely 
gender neutral factor to assert the FOTS defense, suggesting that 
employers must at least demonstrate a legitimate reason. In Corning 
Glass Works v. Brennan,16 which is, remarkably, still the only Supreme 
Court case decided squarely under the Equal Pay Act, the Court held that 
work performed on the day and night shifts involved similar working 
conditions since they occurred in the same surroundings and involved the 
same hazards. As a result, proof that the company paid male night shift 
workers a higher base wage (in addition to the premium paid to all 
workers on the night shift) than female workers doing the same job on 
the day shift established a prima facie violation of the Act.17 Because the 
history at the plant showed that the men demanded a higher base wage 
to induce them to do what they regarded as “women’s work,” inspection 
jobs, at a time when women were prohibited by law from performing night 
work, and because the higher base wage remained even after the company 
added a pay differential to compensate all employees working the night 
shift, the employer failed to prove that the pay differential resulted from 
a factor other than sex.18 In the course of discussing the defense, the 
Court cited legislative history describing differences in work conditions 
as a “legitimate” reason for a pay differential.19 The quoted text implies 
that factors other than sex must at least be legitimate for purposes of the 
defense. 
Four years later, in City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power 
v. Manhart,20 the Court again discussed the FOTS defense. The case 
involved a Title VII challenge to the company’s practice of charging 
female employees higher pension premiums on the ground that women as 
                                                            
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(h) (2012) (“It shall not be an unlawful employment practice 
under [Title VII] for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the 
amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such 
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act].”); Cnty. of Wash. v. 
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168–69 (1981) (interpreting the Bennett Amendment to incorporate 
into Title VII sex-based pay discrimination claims the affirmative defenses codified in the 
EPA). 
 16. 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
 17. Id. at 203–05. 
 18. Id. at 191–92 n.3. 
 19. Id. at 201. 
 20. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
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a group live longer than men.21 The Court found the premium differential 
violated Title VII. Responding to the employer’s argument that the 
Bennett Amendment to Title VII excused any differential that satisfied 
the Equal Pay Act’s FOTS defense, the Court explained that the factor 
other than sex could not itself be based on sex, so that the employer’s use 
of sex as a proxy for longevity did not satisfy the defense.22 Not every 
factor that is related to business qualifies as a factor other than sex, for 
purposes of the defense, the Court continued.23 Again, the Court’s 
language suggests that a factor other than sex must relate to the 
employer’s business. 
Finally, in another Title VII case decided a few years later, County 
of Washington v. Gunther,24 the Court affirmed a lower court decision 
finding that the county’s practice of paying women prison guards at a 
women’s prison significantly less than male guards at a men’s prison 
violated Title VII.25 The jobs guarding male prisoners substantially 
differed from the jobs guarding female prisoners, so the employer argued 
that because the practice did not violate the Equal Pay Act, which only 
applies to similar jobs, the Bennett Amendment meant that it did not 
violate Title VII either.26 The Court rejected this argument, holding that 
Title VII has a potentially broader scope than the EPA, since the EPA 
requires substantially similar jobs while Title VII is violated by paying 
an employee less because of his or her sex.27 In the case at hand, even 
though the jobs were dissimilar, the county’s failure to pay women guards 
at the level recommended by the county’s own pay study served as 
evidence of the employer’s discriminatory intent to pay the women less 
because of their sex. In dicta, describing the FOTS defense in the course 
of explaining how the Bennett Amendment interacts with Title VII, the 
Court stated that the FOTS exception was enacted by Congress as a 
response to the “legitimate needs of businesses” and is limited to “bona 
fide job evaluation systems.”28 This language too suggests some business-
relatedness constraint on the FOTS defense. 
These early cases suggest, albeit in dicta, that courts should not 
simply defer to employer assertions of a sex-neutral factor, but should 
scrutinize them to ensure that they are at least legitimate and business 
related. However, a more recent pronouncement in Supreme Court case 
law suggests a more lax approach. In a case decided under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Smith v. Jackson,29 the 
Court held that disparate impact is actionable under the ADEA. In a part 
                                                            
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 712. 
 23. Id. 
 24. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 168. 
 28. Id. at 170–71. 
 29. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
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of the opinion joined by only four Justices, the plurality discussed a 
provision in the ADEA known as the RFOA (“reasonable factor other than 
age”) as an additional source of support for the ruling.30 The plurality 
contrasted the language in the EPA’s FOTS defense with the language in 
the RFOA, which permits an employment practice that is “otherwise 
prohibited” under the ADEA if it was based on “reasonable factors other 
than age” (RFOA).31 In contrast, the plurality noted, in the FOTS defense, 
“Congress barred recovery if a pay differential was based ‘on any other 
factor’—reasonable or unreasonable—other than sex.”32 This language 
assumes that the only criteria for the sex-neutral factor is that it not be 
based on sex. 
This shift in the Court’s tone toward the FOTS defense is in keeping 
with the Court’s move away from legitimacy as a constraint on the 
employer’s nondiscriminatory reason in the individual disparate 
treatment framework. In the Court’s first articulation of the burden-
shifting model for individual disparate treatment claims in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green,33 it described the burden on the employer as 
requiring a “legitimate” nondiscriminatory reason. Pointing out the 
strength of McDonnell Douglas’s reason for not rehiring the plaintiff, who 
had engaged in an illegal and disruptive demonstration against it, the 
Court implied that weaker employer justifications might not be 
“reasonable” or “legitimate” enough to meet the employer’s burden.34 In 
its more recent case law, however, the Court abandoned any legitimacy 
constraint on the nondiscriminatory reason asserted by the employer. The 
clearest indication of this retreat is Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins,35 
an age discrimination claim, in which the Court held that firing an 
employee in order to prevent him from vesting in the company’s pension 
benefits qualified as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason despite its 
illegality under ERISA and despite the adverse impact such a rule had on 
older employees.36 As long as the reason is nondiscriminatory—meaning 
only that it is “analytically distinct” from the protected class—it suffices 
to rebut the inference of discrimination.37 While the Biggins holding does 
                                                            
 30. Id. 
 31. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2012). 
 32. 544 U.S. at 239 n.11 (plurality opinion). 
 33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 34. 411 U.S. at 802–03 (“We need not attempt in the instant case to detail every 
matter which fairly could be recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire.”); id. at 803 
n.17 (“[w]e need not consider or decide here whether, or under what circumstances, unlawful 
activity not directed against the particular employer may be a legitimate justification for 
refusal to rehire”); id. at 806 n.21 (“. . . in this case, given the seriousness and harmful potential 
of respondent’s participation in the ‘stall-in’ and the accompanying inconvenience to other 
employees, it cannot be said that the petitioner’s refusal . . . lacked a rational and neutral 
business justification.”); id. at 804 (citing the employer’s “reaction, if any, to [the plaintiff’s] 
legitimate civil rights activities” as evidence relevant to showing pretext). 
 35. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 611. 
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not govern the EPA’s FOTS defense—it involves a different statute and 
the scope of the employer’s burden to rebut the inference from the prima 
facie caserather than an affirmative defense—its approach is consistent 
with the plurality’s description of the FOTS defense in Smith. 
Meanwhile, lacking authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court 
on the scope of the FOTS defense, lower courts have taken a wide range 
of approaches on the strength of the sex-neutral reason required to 
establish the defense. At the most deferential end of the spectrum, some 
courts perceive absolutely no constraint on the sex-neutral factor that will 
support the defense and refuse to scrutinize the reasonableness of the 
employer’s reason.38 Other courts require the sex-neutral factor to at least 
be “legitimate,” but apply this standard in such a way as to approve the 
asserted reason with little scrutiny of its relationship to the employer’s 
business needs.39 Other courts go well beyond this, however, and have 
ramped up their scrutiny of the business justifications behind the sex-
neutral factor.40 These courts apply a level of scrutiny that is effectively 
indistinguishable from that proposed by the Paycheck Fairness Act, that 
the employer demonstrate a “bona fide” factor other than sex that is “job-
related with respect to the position in question” and “consistent with 
business necessity.”41 
The “anything goes” courts permit any sex-neutral factor, reasonable 
or not, to justify a pay disparity, with no scrutiny of the business 
justification for relying on it.  Cases in the Fourth, Seventh and Eighth 
Circuits adopt this approach. For example, the Fourth Circuit has broadly 
construed the FOTS defense, requiring only that the employer’s reason 
be sex-neutral; under this standard, the employer’s process of considering 
the higher-paid male employee’s resume and prior salary, and negotiating 
with him, met the requirement of a sex-neutral reason for paying him 
more than the plaintiff.42 The Seventh Circuit put it more bluntly, 
explaining that all the statute asks is whether the employer’s reason was 
or was not based on sex, “not whether it is a ‘good’ reason.”43 Accordingly, 
the court permitted paying a woman less for performing the same work 
where the employer had set pay for lateral hires based on prior salary, 
without inquiring into whether the employer had an “acceptable business 
                                                            
 38. See discussion infra notes 43–47. 
 39. See discussion infra notes 49–56. 
 40. See discussion infra notes 57–70. 
 41. See The Paycheck Fairness Act, HR 1619, 114th Cong. (2015), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1619/text/ih. 
 42. Brinkley v. Harbour Rec. Club, 180 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Maron v. 
Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State U., 508 Fed. Appx. 226 (4th Cir. 2013) (employer need only offer 
credible evidence, not the best possible evidence, that the sex-neutral factor explained the pay 
disparity). 
 43. Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Looper 
v. U. of Wisc. Hosp. & Clinics Auth., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62056 (explaining that the 
employer’s reason for paying the female plaintiff less than a male comparator—her limited 
salary history with the company and their reliance on the pay grade system for setting benefit 
levels for employees with less than one year seniority—might not be a good business practice, 
but that such considerations are irrelevant under the statute). 
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reason” for doing so or whether the practice was “business-related.”44 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has upheld an informal and subjective 
salary retention policy allowing some higher-paid employees to retain 
their pay when assigned lower pay-grade jobs, proclaiming no role for the 
court in evaluating the reasonableness or wisdom of such a policy.45 
In this class of cases, the FOTS defense operates as a de facto 
requirement that the employer acted with discriminatory intent, albeit, 
with the burden on the employer to dispel an inference of discriminatory 
intent by showing a sex-neutral reason for its action, instead of putting 
the burden on the plaintiff to prove intent as an element of the plaintiff’s 
proof. Without any constraint on the FOTS defense, the EPA is limited to 
reaching only those pay disparities found to stem from the employer’s 
intent to pay women less because of sex. The anything-goes cases 
illustrate that broadly construing the FOTS defense effectively narrows 
the statute to reach only intentionally discriminatory pay gaps.46 
Moving away from the anything-goes end of the spectrum, some 
lower courts—even some courts in the same circuits that have articulated 
the deferential approach—apply some degree of scrutiny to assess the 
strength of the employer’s reasons for using the sex-neutral factor.47 This 
can result in rejecting the defense, as in one Eighth Circuit case where 
the court affirmed a jury decision for the plaintiff and rejected the 
employer’s reliance on education and special recruitment efforts as 
factors other than sex.48 The court found the employer’s reliance on 
education unpersuasive since the skills needed for the job were acquired 
on-site, and rejected the employer’s explanation that it needed to pay the 
male comparator more in order to recruit him, explaining that external 
salary pressures are not a valid reason for paying a comparator more.49 
More recently, a district court in the Eighth Circuit found for the plaintiff 
in a bench trial, rejecting prior salary, salary negotiations, and the 
employer’s effort to meet the salary demands of its top candidate as 
insufficiently valid reasons for paying the female plaintiff less to do 
substantially similar work.50 
Sometimes courts purport to look into the legitimacy of the 
employer’s reasons, requiring some showing of reasonableness and 
business justification, but find the employer’s reason to be sufficiently 
business-related with minimal scrutiny. For example, in EEOC v. J.C. 
Penney Co.,51 the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court’s grant of summary 
                                                            
 44. Id. at 467–68. 
 45. Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 46. See, e.g., Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
the FOTS need not be a good reason as long as it is gender-neutral and applied in good faith). 
 47. See discussion infra, notes 49–53. 
 48. Simpson v. Merchs. & Planters Bank, 441 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 49. Id. at 574, 579. 
 50. Ewald v. Royal Norwegian Embassy, 82 F. Supp. 3d 871 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 51. 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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for the employer based on its assertion of a head of household 
requirement for spousal medical insurance coverage. The court rejected 
the employer’s argument that any sex-neutral factor could support a 
disparity in compensation, insisting that the factor must at least be based 
on a legitimate business reason.52 The court went on, however, to accept 
the head of household requirement, despite its correlation with sex, as 
resting on the employer’s legitimate belief that the requirement was an 
appropriate non-sex based incentive to provide the greatest level of 
benefits to those employees most in need and to retain and attract 
employees.53 The court did so despite the employer’s inability to prove 
that it could not have accomplished these business goals by using a rule 
with a less discriminatory effect on women.54 
Courts occupying this middle ground take a compromise position on 
the use of prior salary history to support the FOTS defense. Rather than 
flatly barring prior salary or whole-sale accepting it, these courts permit 
reliance on prior salary but only if it is combined with some other sex-
neutral factor. Reliance on prior salary combined with the comparator’s 
greater relevant experience, for example, suffices to establish the FOTS 
defense under this approach.55 
In the past few years, a spate of cases have come down the pike 
taking a tougher stance, placing more meaningful constraints on the 
sufficiency of the employer’s business reasons in support of the factor 
other than sex. While not a wholesale departure from earlier precedents 
scrutinizing the legitimacy of employer reasons, these cases strike a 
notably critical stance toward broad uses of the defense. In one of the 
tougher FOTS cases, Sandor v. Safe Horizon,56 the court actually granted 
the employee summary judgment on the EPA claim, rejecting the 
employer’s attempt to justify the pay disparity based on the greater 
experience of the male comparator and the employer’s immediate need to 
fill the position when the plaintiff went on maternity leave. As to 
experience, although the comparator did have greater experience, the 
court noted that it was not in a comparable position; a difference in 
experience must be a job-related qualification for the position in question, 
the court explained.57 The court similarly scrutinized the employer’s 
immediate need and salary-matching reasons, finding them lacking force 
in this case.58 
In another tough scrutiny case, the court rejected several factors 
commonly asserted under the FOTS defense, prior salary, inducement, 
                                                            
 52. Id. at 253. 
 53. Id. at 253–54. 
 54. Id. at 253. 
 55. See, e.g., Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 1995); Balmer v. HCA, Inc., 423 
F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2005); EEOC v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 4:07CV0143, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11596 (D. Ohio 2009); Rexroat v. Ariz. Dep’t of Educ., No. CIV. 11-1028-PHX-PGR, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3515 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
 56. No. 08-CV-4636 (ILG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3346 (E.D. N.Y. 2011). 
 57. Id. at 10. 
 58. Id. at 14.  
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and negotiation. In Dreves v. Hudson Group Retail,59 the court insisted 
on a bona fide business-related reason for any sex-neutral factor, and 
rejected the employer’s explanation that it needed to pay more to induce 
the male comparator to relocate his family and take the job; the court 
found this reason to be insufficiently related to the characteristics of the 
job in question. The court also rejected negotiation as a reason, finding 
that a male comparator’s ability to negotiate for a higher salary lacked a 
legitimate business justification.60 Notably, this court too granted 
summary judgment to the plaintiff.61 
These two cases are outliers to some degree, given how rarely courts 
ever grant summary judgment to plaintiffs in employment discrimination 
cases.62 But they are not alone in their rigorous review of the business 
justifications for a sex-neutral factor to explain a gender wage gap. Other 
courts have applied a similarly tough substantive standard, requiring a 
bona fide, job-related business justification, to support the defense. 
Applying this standard, courts have rejected employers’ assertions of 
many commonly used, facially gender-neutral explanations for paying 
women less, including job reclassification systems,63 subjective 
evaluations of employee worth,64 and retention policies that hold current 
employees at their pre-existing, higher rate of pay when they are assigned 
to lower-paying job duties.65 
Some courts have also begun to take a critical look at employers’ 
reliance on “market” factors such as the need to pay more to attract a 
male candidate, the use of prior salary to set pay, and the male 
comparator’s more aggressive negotiation for higher pay. While there is a 
wide range of judicial reactions to market-based arguments, some recent 
decisions reflect a skepticism of market-based criteria such as these. For 
example, in Sauceda v. University of Texas,66 the court rejected “salary 
compression”—in which the university paid more to attract new hires 
from an outside university while paying less to existing faculty 
members—as a factor other than sex, equating the employer’s “supply 
and demand” argument to the kind of stereotyped, sex-based assumptions 
embedded in the employment market that Congress sought to correct 
                                                            
 59. No. 2:11-CV-4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82636 (D. Vt. 2013). 
 60. Id. at 8–9. 
 61. Id. at 13. 
 62. See Nancy Gertner, Loser’s Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 (Oct. 16, 2012) 
(discussing the one-sidedness of employment discrimination litigation). 
 63. See, e.g., Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting gender-
neutral classification system where it was not based on legitimate business-related differences 
in work responsibilities and qualifications for the positions at issue). 
 64. See Siler v. First State Bank, No. 04-1161-T-AN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46200 
(D. Tenn. 2005) (employer could not rely on its subjective evaluation of greater interpersonal 
skills of male comparator without objective evidence); Cole v. N. Am. Breweries, No. 1:13-CV-
236, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6157 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (employer’s “experience-driven” salary 
model was too amorphous to serve as a factor other than sex). 
 65. See, e.g., Glenn v. Gen. Motors, 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 66. 958 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Texas 2013). 
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through the EPA.67 The Eighth Circuit took a similarly dim view of 
reliance on market value to set pay in a recent case, Drum v. Leeson 
Electric Company,68 cautioning that courts must take care to ensure that 
they do not permit employers to pay women lower wages simply because 
the market will bear it. The Dreves court, mentioned above, in granting 
summary judgment to the employee, was particularly scathing about the 
employer’s reliance on the comparator’s negotiation skill to justify his 
higher pay, admonishing that a pay disparity is no more justified when it 
is the result of a single negotiation than when it is the result of a market-
wide phenomenon in a market that differently values the work of men 
and women.69 
The rigorous approach taken by these courts is not without 
controversy, not least of all from courts taking the opposite view and 
finding sex-neutrality alone to satisfy the defense. The Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Wernsing served up the fiercest criticism of the business 
justification strand of case law. Critiquing the case law that requires a 
job-related business reason for the sex-neutral factor, the court 
characterized the EPA as depending on an employer’s discriminatory 
intent to pay different wages because of sex.70 Since unequal pay for equal 
work is an intentional wrong, the court continued, and markets are 
impersonal, an employer’s reliance on the market cannot be 
discriminatory.71 Those courts that require merit-based, job-related 
factors, instead of simply deferring to the employer’s assessment of 
supply and demand, are heading into the forbidden territory of 
“comparable worth,” the Seventh Circuit warned.72 Responding to the 
counter-argument that such deference to the market locks in the gender 
wage gap since women’s wages are less than men’s, the court tipped its 
hand by revealing the gender ideology behind its deferential approach to 
the market. Wages rise with experience, the court explained, and the 
reason for the disparity between men’s and women’s wages is that 
“women spend more years in child-rearing.”73 Against that default 
assumption, scrutinizing the business justification behind market 
explanations stood out as an unjustified intrusion into employer 
prerogatives, taking the claim away from its disparate treatment roots 
and into the forbidden land of disparate impact.74 
                                                            
 67. Id. at 778–80. 
 68. 565 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 69. No. 2:11-CV-4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 27. But see, e.g., Underwood v. Sears & 
Roebuck & Co., 343 F. Supp. 2d 259 (D. Del. 2004) (accepting male comparator’s negotiation 
for a higher salary as a factor other than sex); Weber v. Infinity Broad. Corp., No. 02-74602, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40724 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (same); Schultz v. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 752 
F. Supp. 2d 1015 (W. Dist. Wis. 2010) (same). 
 70. Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 469. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 470. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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The turn in some of the more recent court decisions toward careful 
examination of the business justifications behind an employer’s reason 
for paying different wages finds support in an unexpected place. The 
Supreme Court’s recent pregnancy discrimination decision makes a 
similar move.75 Understanding the theory behind that decision can help 
support the parallel move to tighten up the FOTS defense and respond to 
criticism that doing so would transform the pay claim from a disparate 
treatment claim for intentional discrimination to a disparate impact 
claim. 
II. LESSONS FROM YOUNG V. UPS: UNJUSTIFIED IMPACT AS 
PROOF OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT 
The Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Young v. United Parcel 
Services, Inc.76 was the first major pregnancy discrimination case to reach 
the Court in nearly a quarter century.77 Peggy Young sued her employer, 
UPS, after it denied her request for light-duty work in response to a lifting 
restriction from her doctor during her first trimester of pregnancy.78 
Under its formal policies and past practices, UPS liberally granted such 
requests—except for workers whose need for light-duty accommodation 
stemmed from a pregnancy.79 The record showed that if Peggy Young had 
been injured at work, lost her driver’s license (she was an air driver for 
UPS), or had a disability for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, UPS would have granted her request for a light-duty assignment for 
the duration of her lifting restriction.80 Instead, UPS forced Young to take 
an unpaid leave from work and she lost her health insurance—a result 
that appeared particularly harsh given that her job actually required 
little to no lifting in excess of the medical restriction and her coworkers 
had offered to help her with whatever heavy lifting was required.81 
The Court took the case to clear up the confusion in the lower courts 
over how to apply the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) when an 
employer favors some, but not all, workers with a similar work capacity 
over a pregnant employee.82 The issue required the Court to interpret 
clause two of the PDA, which states: “. . . women affected by pregnancy, 
                                                            
 75. See generally Young, 135 S.Ct. 1338.  
 76. 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015). 
 77. See Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (rejecting the 
BFOQ defense to the company’s exclusion of pregnant women from jobs with high lead 
exposure risks). In the interim, the Court issued a narrow ruling under the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, finding a challenge to the continuing effects of pre-Act discrimination to 
be time-barred. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009). 
 78. Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1344. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1348 (citing “lower court uncertainty” about how to apply the Act in this 
setting). 
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childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all 
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work. . . .”83 The Court found this language 
ambiguous. Does it “mean that courts must compare workers only in 
respect to the work limitations that they suffer” and “ignore all other 
similarities or differences between pregnant and nonpregnant 
workers?”84 “Or does it mean that courts, when deciding who the relevant 
‘other persons’ are, may consider other similarities and differences as 
well” and “[i]f so, which ones?”85 
Significantly, the Court began from the premise that Peggy Young’s 
challenge to UPS’s failure to accommodate her lifting restriction while 
pregnant was a disparate treatment claim.86 Indeed, the Court took pains 
to note that Young did not bring a disparate impact claim, explaining the 
critical difference between the two categories as follows: disparate 
treatment requires proof of discriminatory intent while disparate impact 
focuses on “the effects of an employment practice . . . irrespective of 
motivation or intent.”87 
Finding no clarity from the text of clause two as to how this disparate 
treatment claim should work, the Court turned to the foundational 
individual disparate treatment case of McDonnell Douglas to construct a 
similar burden-shifting model for pregnancy discrimination when an 
employer disfavors pregnant workers compared to some (but not all) other 
employees with a similar ability or inability to work. The Court outlined 
the modified McDonnell Douglas framework for this setting as follows. 
First, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that she is 
within the protected class (affected by pregnancy or related medical 
condition) and sought an accommodation which her employer denied, 
despite accommodating “others ‘similar in their ability or inability to 
work.’”88 Once the plaintiff meets the prima facie case, the employer “may 
then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on 
‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reasons for denying her 
accommodation.”89 In a departure from the classic McDonnell Douglas 
framework, in which any nondiscriminatory explanation meets this 
burden, the Court in Young set limits on the kind of pregnancy-neutral 
                                                            
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2015). 
 84. Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1348. 
 85. Id. at 1349. 
 86. Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1344. 
 87. Id. Young actually had sought, unsuccessfully, to amend her complaint to add a 
disparate impact claim. Young v. UPS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30764 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2010) 
(denying plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint and add a disparate impact claim for failure 
to exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a disparate impact charge with the EEOC). 
 88. Id. at 1353–54. 
 89. Id. at 1354. 
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explanations that suffice.90 The mere desire to save money and/or 
maximize convenience by withholding accommodations from pregnant 
workers are not, the Court cautioned, legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reasons for refusing to accommodate pregnant workers.91 
If the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff may then attempt to 
show that the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is really a 
pretext for discrimination. Here’s where things become interesting. The 
Court explained this stage of the burden-shifting framework as follows: 
[T]he plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing 
sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a 
significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s 
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently 
strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along 
with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional 
discrimination.92 
Under this PDA pretext model, the weakness of the employer’s 
business justification for treating pregnant workers worse than some 
favored workers with a similar work capacity establishes that the 
employer’s reason was really a pretext for discrimination. The plaintiff 
need not show any separate proof of discriminatory intent; she need show 
only that the employer’s reason was not “strong” enough “to justify the 
burden” on pregnant women.93 
Predictably, the dissenting Justices, led by Justice Scalia, accused 
the Court of “bungling the dichotomy between claims of disparate 
treatment and claims of disparate impact” and bemoaned “the topsy-
turvy world” in which “a pregnant woman can establish disparate 
treatment by showing that the effects of her employer’s policy fall more 
harshly on pregnant women than on others . . . and are inadequately 
justified.”94 In response to the dissent’s charge of blurring the treatment-
impact boundary, the Court emphasized “the continued focus on whether 
the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference 
of intentional discrimination avoids confusing the disparate-treatment 
and disparate-impact doctrines.”95 As a matter of law, however, under the 
Young framework, the intentional discrimination that the model purports 
to discern may exist even when the employer genuinely believed the 
                                                            
 90. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993) (employer’s 
nondiscriminatory reason need only be analytically distinct from the protected class, it need 
not be “legitimate” in any substantive sense). 
 91. Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1354. As the Court explained its rationale for this limitation, 
a cost- or convenience-based justification for excluding pregnancy from the class of conditions 
covered might have justified even the benefit policy at issue in General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 
U.S. 125 (1976), the very case that prompted Congress to enact the PDA. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1354. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1365 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 1355. 
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factually correct, albeit (as determined by a court) insufficiently weighty 
reason for disfavoring pregnant women. This marks an innovation from 
the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework in which an honest belief 
in a nondiscriminatory reason dispels an inference of intentional 
discrimination, even if the employer’s reason was not just poor in its 
rationale but incorrect in its factual premises.96 
Although not fully elaborated, the Young opinion contains the seeds 
of a defense of the bridge from unjustified impact to disparate treatment. 
The model the Court crafted proceeds on the theory that the burden on 
pregnant women from the employer’s policies, when insufficiently 
justified by a good enough business rationale, reflects the employer’s 
insufficient concern for pregnant workers and their employment 
opportunities. The question at the heart of the model is, as the Court 
phrases it, “Why, when the employer accommodated so many, could it not 
accommodate pregnant women as well?”97 Answering truthfully with a 
nondiscriminatory explanation is not enough if the explanation is not 
weighty enough to justify the harm. 
While admittedly, it tugs at the boundary of the disparate treatment 
category to infer discriminatory intent from unjustified impact, it is 
hardly unprecedented. In a case decided the same term as Young, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, 
Inc.,98 the Court similarly broadened the disparate treatment framework, 
this time for religious discrimination, to encompass an employer’s facially 
neutral rule that burdens members of a religious group along with 
nonreligious workers. In that case, the store’s “Look Policy” prohibiting 
caps and other head coverings had the effect of excluding Muslim women 
who wear head scarfs for religious reasons, even as it excluded other 
applicants who wear caps and other head coverings for nonreligious 
reasons. Instead of requiring the EEOC to prove that the store’s policy 
was adopted with the discriminatory purpose of excluding Muslim 
women, or applied with a discriminatory intent to exclude Muslim 
applicants, the Court upheld the suit, overturning the lower court’s grant 
of summary judgment to the employer. The court found the employer had 
engaged in disparate treatment because it assigned Muslim applicants to 
a larger group of disfavored applicants without a sufficiently strong 
reason for not exempting religious applicants from the general ban.99 The 
Court resoundingly rejected the employer’s argument that this should 
                                                            
 96. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (“The 
fact that a court may think that the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants 
does not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether 
the employer’s reasons are pretexts for discrimination.”). 
 97. Young, 135 S.Ct. at 1355. 
 98. 135 S.Ct. 2028 (2015). 
 99. See Michael C. Harper, Distinguishing Disparate Treatment from Disparate 
Impact: Confusion on the Court, Oct. 30, 2015, SSRN (on file with author). 
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have been brought as a disparate impact claim, situating it firmly within 
a disparate treatment framework.100 
A greater stretch of the disparate treatment boundary occurred in 
the politically charged case of Ricci v. DeStefano,101 a Title VII action 
brought by a group of mostly white firefighters (excepting the one Latino 
named plaintiff) challenging the city of New Haven’s decision to discard 
the results of a standardized test for promotion that would have had a 
disparate impact against minority firefighters. The Court found that the 
plaintiffs succeeded in establishing that the city engaged in race-based 
disparate treatment when it decided not to make promotions based on the 
test results without a sufficient basis in evidence for believing that using 
the test would subject it to disparate impact liability. The key to 
understanding how the decision expands disparate treatment doctrine is 
that the city’s action was neutral on its face—it discarded the test results 
for everyone and made no promotions—and the plaintiffs offered no proof 
that the City acted with a deliberate discriminatory intent to harm white 
firefighters because of their race. Although the city clearly knew that 
discarding the test results would mean that the firefighters who 
performed well, a group that was disproportionately white, would not be 
promoted, mere knowledge of disproportionate harm is usually not 
tantamount to a discriminatory racial intent.102 Instead of requiring proof 
that the city acted with a deliberate intent to harm white firefighters 
because they are white, the Court focused on the lack of a sufficient 
justification for burdening the high-performing, mostly white, test-
takers. Because the Court found that the promotion test actually was job-
related, it concluded that the city had an insufficient basis to believe that 
it would have faced disparate impact liability for making promotions 
based on the test. In other words, the unjustified burden on the group of 
predominantly white test-takers formed the crux of the disparate 
treatment violation. 
Although they lie at the margins of employment discrimination law, 
these cases share space with others relying on a significant burden to the 
plaintiff class, combined with the employer’s insufficient justification for 
it, to support a claim for disparate treatment.103 An applicant strength 
test known to reduce female applicants’ chances for employment and 
adopted with weak justification, for example, was the basis for a 
judgment of disparate treatment, in addition to disparate impact, against 
                                                            
100. Abercrombie, 135 S.Ct. at 2033. 
101. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
102. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (rejecting women’s equal 
protection challenge to state’s veterans preference in public employment; even though the 
state knew that the class of veterans benefited was over 98% male and would have the effect 
of shutting women out of state jobs, plaintiffs must prove the state adopted the preference 
“because of” and not “in spite of” the harm to women). 
103. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 701, 776 n.266 (2006). 
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the employer adopting it.104 Likewise, an English-only policy with a 
predictably harsh effect on Latino employees, adopted without weighty 
business reasons, has supported disparate treatment liability against the 
employer.105 And harassment has always difficult to classify as purely 
disparate treatment, especially when it does not target particular 
individuals or when it is perpetrated by persons not acting as agents of 
the employer.106 Nevertheless, it is well-settled that harassment is a 
species of disparate treatment.107 
All that is to say, there is more porosity along the treatment/impact 
border than the Court and many commentators often acknowledge. In the 
Young PDA framework, the unjustified burden on pregnant women from 
the employer’s accommodation of other conditions with a similar effect on 
work establishes a disparate treatment claim. This path to disparate 
treatment has implications for the recent efforts, both judicial and 
legislative, to more carefully evaluate the strength of the business 
reasons behind an employer’s asserted sex-neutral factor in equal pay 
claims. Contrary to critics’ charges, tightening the FOTS defense to 
incorporate a more rigorous scrutiny of purportedly sex-neutral 
justifications would not represent an unprecedented merger of disparate 
treatment and disparate impact claims. 
That this move finds support in the case law, however, does not 
necessarily make it normatively defensible. For that, we need to consider 
what purpose it serves to infer discriminatory intent from insufficiently 
justified harm to the protected class. Here too, the Young case contains 
helpful insights. The model the Court adopted is well-suited to capturing 
the kind of bias and devaluation of pregnant workers that leads 
employers to deny pregnant employees the same accommodations that 
are broadly granted to others. Requiring additional proof of an intent to 
discriminate against pregnancy would leave the Act unable to reach the 
kinds of biased implicit judgments about pregnant workers that underlie 
selective accommodation policies like the one at issue in Young. 
                                                            
104. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Dial Corp., 469 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(discussing weak justification for employee strength test with a marked disparate impact on 
women supported disparate treatment verdict for the EEOC). 
105. See Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting insufficient 
business justification for strict English-only policy supported employees’ disparate treatment 
claim). 
106. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, 
Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357 
(2009) (explaining the difficulty of situating sexual harassment within classic disparate 
treatment theory). 
107. See, e.g., Marian C. Haney, Litigation of a Sexual Harassment Case After the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1044–45 (1993) (explaining that the 1991 
Act’s addition of a damages remedy for “intentional discrimination,” as opposed to disparate 
impact, means that sexual harassment claimants will now be able to seek damages under the 
statute); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (treating sexual harassment 
as intentional discrimination for purposes of the 1991 Civil Rights Act). But cf. Camille Hebert, 
The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341 
(2004–05) (arguing for a disparate impact approach to sexual harassment). 
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The refusal to accommodate pregnant workers, even while granting 
accommodations to many other employees, is likely not the product of a 
deliberate, conscious animus against pregnant workers.108 It more likely 
reflects the employer’s relative lack of concern for pregnant workers and 
the lesser value the employer places on retaining them in the 
workplace.109 Research on the maternal wall has documented “an 
underlying schema that assumes a lack of competence and commitment 
when women are viewed through the lens of motherhood and 
housework.”110 The implicit assumption that pregnancy marks a 
detachment from the labor force and prioritization of family over work 
shapes employer evaluations about how much to invest in retaining of 
pregnant workers. Viewing workers through the lens of prospective 
motherhood, employers overestimate the disruption that would result 
from accommodating pregnant workers and under-estimate the business 
value of retaining them.111 In the Young case itself, for example, the 
employer held fast to its refusal to accommodate pregnancy despite the 
fact that Peggy Young’s coworkers volunteered to help her with any lifting 
that exceeded the medical restriction, so that any disruption would have 
been negligible or nonexistent.112 Whether consciously or not, stereotyped 
judgments about the worth of pregnant workers shape employers’ 
decisions about whether and how much to invest in them as employees.113 
                                                            
108. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act at 35, 21 DUKE J. OF GENDER L. & POL’Y 67, 102–03 (2013) (discussing the 
complexity of cultural reactions to mothers, which include a reverence for pregnancy and 
idealized motherhood and an ambivalence about working mothers). 
109. Cf. Jane A. Halpert et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in Performance 
Appraisals, 14 J. ORG. BEHAV. 649 (1993) (reporting results of study finding male reviewers 
engaged in stereotyping against pregnant workers, resulting in significantly more negative 
performance appraisals). 
110. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: 
Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and 
Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1327 (2008). 
111. For a sampling of the research documenting bias in how pregnant workers are 
evaluated, see Jennifer Cunningham & Therese Macan, Effects of Applicant Pregnancy on 
Hiring Decisions and Interview Ratings, 57 SEX ROLES 497 (2007); Bragger et al., The Effects 
of the Structured Interview on Reducing Biases Against Pregnant Job Applicants, 46 SEX 
ROLES 215 (2002); Caroline Gatrell, Managing the Maternal Body: A Comprehensive Review 
and Transdisciplinary Analysis, 13 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 97, 98–100 (2011); Barbara Masser 
et al., ‘We Like You, But We Don’t Want You’—The Impact of Pregnancy in the Workplace, 57 
SEX ROLES 703 (2007); Liisa Mäkelä, A Narrative Approach to Pregnancy-related 
Discrimination and Leader-follower Relationships, 19 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 677 (2011); 
Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 
1306 (2007). 
112. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344. 
113. See Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at Work: Neomaternalism in the Making 
of Sex Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 476–79 (2014) (explaining that employer 
estimates of the cost of pregnancy leave contained biases about the expected return on 
employer investments in workers and assumptions about conflicts between work and 
pregnancy); Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
961, 1028, 1032 (2013) (discussing the role of stereotype-driven estimates of cost and “still 
908 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 52 
 
The searching review of employer justifications for less generous policies 
toward pregnancy, as mandated in Young, is well-designed to reach this 
kind of bias.114 
This justification for Young’s reliance on unjustified impact to infer 
discriminatory intent—that it is necessary to reach the stereotyping and 
implicit bias behind the different treatment of the protected class—also 
supports extending this hybrid treatment-by-impact model to the equal 
pay claim. The next section considers what is to be gained from tightening 
up the FOTS defense to scrutinize the employer’s business reasons for 
paying women less. 
III. THE CASE FOR TIGHTENING THE FOTS DEFENSE: 
CONTESTING MARKET NEUTRALITY AND UNCOVERING 
IMPLICIT BIAS IN SETTING PAY. 
At its broadest, without any inquiry into the business case for paying 
a woman less, the FOTS defense threatens to turn the disparate 
treatment equal pay claim into a search for a conscious discriminatory 
intent to pay a woman less because of her sex. If any factor other than 
sex, however slight, can justify paying a woman less to do the same work 
as a man, then the FOTS defense will serve to narrow the scope of 
actionable pay discrimination to include only those pay disparities that 
cannot be explained by a sex-neutral motive. Requiring courts to 
scrutinize the business justification behind the employer’s sex-neutral 
explanation for the pay disparity—as the Paycheck Fairness Act would 
mandate and as some lower courts are already doing—would make the 
equal pay claim more likely to capture pay disparities reflecting implicit 
bias and stereotyped judgments about employee worth, and not just the 
much narrower class of pay decisions stemming from a conscious intent 
to pay women less. 
Rather than reflecting a deliberate decision to take sex into account 
in setting pay—the theory of pay discrimination reflected in the 
majority’s controversial Ledbetter ruling—unequal pay for equal work is 
more likely a reflection of subconscious stereotypes about women’s worth 
as workers.115 The literature on the pay gap suggests that employers 
assess women’s pay at lower levels without realizing they are doing so.116 
A more likely scenario than an employer making a deliberate decision to 
take sex into account in setting pay is that employers rely on 
                                                            
prevalent stereotypes and bias about the capacity of pregnant employees or the likelihood that 
pregnant employees return to work after childbirth” underlying employer policies that 
accommodate some favored conditions while omitting pregnancy). 
114. See Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338. 
115. See Deborah L. Brake, What Counts as “Discrimination” in Ledbetter and the 
Implications for Sex Equality Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 657, 671 (2008) (explaining that the 
Ledbetter decision proceeds from the definition of pay discrimination as a conscious intent to 
pay a woman less because of her sex). 
116. See Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: The High Cost of 
Avoiding Negotiation—and Positive Strategies for Change 98–100, 119–20 (2007). 
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discretionary pay systems that open the door to implicit bias, resulting in 
paying women less. That was the story told by the plaintiffs’ experts in 
the nationwide lawsuit against Wal-Mart, where, controlling for 
seniority, number of weeks worked during the year, full-time or part-time 
work, job position, job review rating, and numerous other factors, women 
at all levels and in all regions received less pay than men in the same 
jobs.117 Lab experiments support this theory, finding that subjects set pay 
at a higher rate for male candidates than for equally qualified female 
candidates.118 It is unlikely that all or most of these subjects consciously 
decided to set lower wages for the women candidates. 
Of course, not everyone agrees that any kind of pay discrimination, 
conscious or not, lies behind the gender wage gap. Skeptics claim that the 
disparity in men’s and women’s wages is due to women’s own choices and 
the neutral market forces that respond to them.119 This article is not the 
place for an exhaustive review of the literature on the gender wage gap 
or to rehash the debate over its sources. Suffice it to say that some 
significant portion of the wage gap is not explained by the 
nondiscriminatory variables that researchers have thought to account 
for.120 The lure of market justifications as an explanation for paying 
women less is precisely why courts need to carefully look at the strength 
of the justifications underlying employers’ appeals to the market as a 
factor other than sex.121 
More careful scrutiny of what lies behind market-based explanations 
as a factor other than sex can reveal the paucity of the employer’s 
                                                            
117. See Deborah Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal Quest 
for Equal Pay, 46 N. ENG. L. REV. 229, 234, 240–41 (2012). The gap increased over a worker’s 
career; for example, among new hourly wage workers, men earned thirty-five cents more per 
hour when hired, but the gap grew to $1.16/hour five years later. Id. at 241. 
118. See, e.g., Rhea E. Steinpreis et al., The Impact of Gender on the Review of the 
Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants and Tenure Candidates: A National Empirical Study, 41 
SEX ROLES 509 (1999); Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 
112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1316 (2007). 
119. See, e.g., Gary Siniscalco et al., The Pay Gap, the Glass Ceiling, and Pay Bias: 
Moving Forward 50 Years After the Equal Pay Act, 29 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 395, 400–13 
(2014). 
120. See, e.g., Marianne DelPo Kulow, Beyond the Paycheck Fairness Act: Mandatory 
Wage Disclosure Laws—A Necessary Tool for Closing the Residual Gender Wage Gap, 50 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 404–06 (2013) (summarizing the literature and demonstrating the inability of 
nondiscriminatory explanations to explain away the gender wage gap); Fifty Years After the 
Equal Pay Act: Assessing the Past, Taking Stock of the Future, NAT’L EQUAL PAY TASK FORCE 
(June 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/image_file/equal_pay-
task_force_progress_report_june_10_2013.pdf; Christianne Corbett & Catherine Hill, 
Graduating to a Pay Gap; The Earnings of Women and Men One Year after College Graduation, 
AAUW (2012), http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/graduating-to-a-pay-gap-the-earnings-of-
women-and-men-one-year-after-college-graduation.pdf (finding a 7% unexplained pay gap 
after accounting for factors such as occupational choice and hours worked). 
121. See MCCANN, supra note 13, at 40–41 (discussing the ease with which employers 
defend pay discrimination claims by invoking “a ‘free market’ defense at every turn” and how 
that argument resonates with judges’ assumptions that “discrimination is the rare exception 
rather than the norm”). 
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justification for relying on “the market” to set pay. Employer suppositions 
about the market are often based on nothing more than stereotyped 
assumptions about employee worth.122 Allusions to the market mask 
embedded preconceptions about marketability that place a higher value 
on male workers.123 While market-based explanations such as prior 
salary, negotiating for pay, or market worth may sound gender-neutral, 
they often incorporate implicitly biased evaluations of employee worth.124 
Unless courts scrutinize the business justifications behind assertions of 
market value, they risk turning the FOTS defense into an open door to 
implicit bias in setting pay.125 
Even if the anything-goes approach to the FOTS defense were 
replaced with a job-relatedness and business necessity standard, 
however, the problem would remain that many courts will never reach 
the defense because of the strict approach to the similarity required to 
make out a prima facie case of unequal pay for substantially equal work. 
Doctrinally, increasing judicial scrutiny of the strength of the employer’s 
reason will not help clear this hurdle. And yet, shifting the equal pay 
claim away from a search for deliberate discriminatory intent may, 
indirectly, lead courts to view this threshold issue differently. The current 
strictness in comparator proof stems from courts’ conception of disparate 
treatment as requiring a conscious discriminatory intent.126 Only by 
eliminating all nontrivial differences between the comparators can courts 
assure themselves that the reason for disfavoring the plaintiff was more 
likely than not the employer’s discriminatory intent instead of some 
benign difference in circumstances.127 In other words, a narrow view of 
disparate treatment as requiring proof of a conscious discriminatory 
                                                            
122. See Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579 (2001); see 
also Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to 
Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 990 (2011) (“In the absence of a professional 
compensation survey, analyzed by a professional compensation consultant, ‘market wages’ are 
simply an employer’s hunch about what the position is worth.”). 
123. See Porter & Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth, supra note 10, at 184 
(discussing the schemas that lead employers to undervalue the market worth of their female 
employees, and cause women worker to undervalue their own worth). See also Paula A. 
Monopoli, The Market Myth and Pay Disparity in Legal Academia, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 867 (2016) 
(discussing how gender bias underlies market justifications for paying women law faculty less 
compared to their male peers). 
124. See MCCANN, supra note 13, at 241 (detailing how wage-setting practices are 
often insulated from market pressures of supply and demand and that market justifications 
often lack empirical support). 
125. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 10, at 162–63 (exposing the gender bias in 
the most common “market excuses” employers use to justify a pay disparity: reliance on prior 
salary, matching of an outside offer, and differences in employees’ willingness to negotiate 
pay). 
126. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 
778–79 (2011). 
127. See Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by 
Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 223 (2009) (“The ultimate basis for the elaborate legal rules 
the courts have developed must be the belief that random fluctuations are more likely than 
discrimination in the American workplace, and thus any differences are more likely 
attributable to a host of rational and irrational factors than they are to an intent to 
discriminate.”). 
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intent is what lies behind the requirement of strict proximity between 
comparators. If that understanding were to shift, so that disparate 
treatment also encompasses implicit bias in setting pay, the reason for 
insisting on strict similarity between comparators would weaken. Of 
course, doctrinally, it is a long way from toughening up the FOTS defense 
to easing up on the similarity of comparators in the prima facie case. But 
it is not so far-fetched to think that changing the theory of discrimination 
embodied in the FOTS defense would have an influence on how courts 
conceive of discrimination at the prima facie case stage too. Substantially 
similar work would still be the touchstone for the equal pay claim, but 
perhaps courts will view that inquiry less rigidly if their understanding 
of what pay discrimination is broadens to encompass implicit bias. 
Even if reshaping the FOTS doctrine does not significantly change 
the outcome of many cases in litigation, it could still have an important 
effect on the political and institutional struggles for pay equality. Michael 
McCann’s important book, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the 
Politics of Legal Mobilization, documents a dynamic relationship between 
formal legal rights, political mobilization and institutional change. Even 
when strengthening legal rights, as with the early Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the equal pay laws, did little to change losing outcomes in 
litigation, it still inspired collective action and provided resources on 
which equal pay advocates could draw in making demands on 
employers.128 Strengthening formal legal rights raises expectations about 
what is possible and mobilizes activists and advocates working for equal 
pay. Even when lawsuits lose, activists may succeed in pressing for 
institutional change, using the language of legal rights as a resource to 
rally supporters and get the attention of employers.129 In McCann’s 
terms, strengthening the doctrine of the equal pay claim enhanced the 
symbolic capital of legal rights.130 The fashioning of doctrinal rules for 
equal pay claims is important not just for its effect on litigation, but also 
for its influence on the social movement and politics of equal pay.131 
Strengthening the FOTS defense as advocated here would invite 
critical scrutiny of the market rationalizations that go to the heart of the 
political and legal battle over equal pay. Enabling the doctrine to expose 
the weaknesses behind these rationales would reveal the implicit gender 
bias in discretionary pay systems that results in paying women less for 
substantially equal work. At the heart of the debate over the proper scope 
                                                            
128. MCCANN, supra note 13, passim (situating rights-claiming as a social practice 
that enables advocates and activists to draw on legal resources in a political dialogue with 
legislatures and employers). 
129. Id. at 138 (arguing that law can be a “club” for employees and a resource for social 
movements even without victory in court, and recognizing “the discursive power of rights 
discourse”). 
130. Id. passim (discussing the symbolic capital of legal rights-framing). 
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change in which law facilitates collective action by citizens). 
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of the FOTS defense is a contest over the legitimacy of market 
explanations for paying women less. By engaging in this debate, the 
FOTS reform strategy could have a feedback effect on litigation outcomes 
by strengthening the social norms in support of pay equality.132 As was 
true for the Ledbetter ruling and the legislative response to it, more is at 
stake in the scope of the FOTS defense than a narrow doctrinal change. 
The issue at the heart of the controversy is the legitimacy of the gender 
wage gap. 
                                                            
132. See Goldberg, supra note 126, at 795 (arguing that the likelihood of judges finding 
discrimination in employment discrimination cases increases when social norms support 
widely held beliefs in the prevalence and wrongfulness of discrimination). 
